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INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW 
STANDARDS CONCERNING COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING IN PUBLIC ESSENTIAL 
SERVICES 
GIUSEPPE CARABETTA∗  
Labour standards adopted under the auspices of the ILO constitute the 
principal international influences on public sector collective bargaining; it 
is those standards that are the subject of this article. Focusing on the position 
of essential public sector employees, ILO principles concerning collective 
bargaining, dispute settlement and the right of workers to withdraw their 
services as part of bargaining are examined. Particular attention is devoted 
to the application of ILO standards to essential public sector employees and 
police officers; and the extent to which Australian law complies with these 
standards. The ILO supervisory bodies have acknowledged that restrictions 
on the general right of workers to collectively bargain and to strike can be 
justified in the case of essential public employees, but only on a minimal or 
proportional analysis. The ILO has also emphasised that any restrictions on 
the right to strike must be compensated by adequate, impartial and speedy 
conciliation and arbitration processes. It is shown, however, that with respect 
to essential public employees and police officers operating under the Fair 
Work Act 2009 (Cth), Australian law falls short on both of these scores, with 
a resultant uncertainty regarding the right of these workers to bargain 
collectively.  
I INTRODUCTION 
One of the core objectives of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) is to 
promote collective bargaining worldwide. This objective was stated in 1944 in 
the Declaration of Philadelphia, which is annexed to the ILO Constitution and 
recognises ‘the solemn obligation of the International Labour Organisation to 
∗ Senior Lecturer, University of Sydney. The author is grateful to the Deakin Law Review’s 
anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions and to Mikaela Jenkins and Ryan Hunter for 
their research assistance. Of course, responsibility for any errors or omissions in the article rests 
with the author alone. 
                                                 
276 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 19 NO 2 
further among the nations of the world programmes which will achieve ... the 
effective recognition of the right of collective bargaining’.1 This nearly 
universally accepted principle is embodied in the ILO’s Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No 98),2 and guarantees to all 
workers, including public sector workers, the rights to organise and bargain 
collectively.3 In June 1998, the ILO took a further step towards the goal by 
adopting the Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (‘the 
Declaration’).4 The Declaration provides that:  
The International Labour Conference ... [d]eclares that all Members, even if 
they have not ratified the [core ILO Conventions]5, have an obligation arising 
from the very fact of membership in the Organization to respect, to promote 
and to realize, in good faith and in accordance with the Constitution, the 
principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the subject of those 
Conventions, namely ... freedom of association and the effective recognition 
of the right to collective bargaining.6 
If collective bargaining is to be effective and sustainable the framework in 
which it takes place must be based on the principles of the independence and 
autonomy of the parties, and ‘voluntary and free collective bargaining’,7 
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1 International Labour Organisation (‘ILO’), Convention concerning the Promotion of Collective 
Bargaining (ILO Convention 154), opened for signature 3 June 1981, 1331 UNTS 267 (entered 
into force 11 August 1983) preamble, para 3. 
2 ILO, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 1949, opened for signature 1 
July 1949, 96 UNTS 257 (entered into force generally 18 July 1951; entered into force for 
Australia 28 February 1973) arts 3–4 (‘Convention No 98’). 
3 Internationally, Convention No 98 is one of the most widely ratified Conventions (currently 
161 ratifications): see ILO, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: A Way Forward 
(Report No III (Part 1B), International Labour Conference — 102nd Session, 2013) 
<http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meeting 
document/wcms_205518.pdf> (‘Collective Bargaining in the Public Service’). It will be noted 
presently however that the application of Convention No. 98 in the public services remains 
controversial in many member states.  
4 ILO, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, ILO Doc CIT/1998/PR20A 
(19 June 1998). The Declaration is binding on Australia by virtue of its membership to the ILO. 
5 There are eight such Conventions; among them: Convention concerning Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (ILO Convention 87), opened for signature 
9 July 1948, 68 UNTS 17 (entered into force 4 July 1950) and International Labour 
Organisation, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 1949, above n 2. 
6 ILO, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, above n 4, art 2. 
7 Bernard Gernigon, Alberto Odero and Horacio Guido, Collective Bargaining: ILO Standards 
and the Principles of the Supervisory Bodies (2000), International Labour Organisation, 27 
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leaving it to the parties to reach their own negotiated settlements. Furthermore, 
the ILO’s supervisory bodies have stated that although certain rules and 
practices — such as mediation and conciliation procedures — can facilitate and 
promote collective bargaining, all legislation establishing machineries and 
procedures designed to facilitate bargaining and settle collective bargaining 
disputes between the social partners must respect the autonomy of the parties.8  
Restrictions on or the removal of the general right of workers to strike in 
support of collective bargaining and its substitution by compulsory arbitration 
can be justified but only on a minimal or proportional analysis. Even in the 
context of the public emergency services, including the police services, the ILO 
has noted that the question of the right to strike in many countries is now less 
of a ‘yes or no issue’, and that blanket prohibition of strikes is less frequent than 
in the past.9 Nonetheless, despite ‘long debates and much experience’,10 the 
question of essential and emergency service employees’ freedom to strike in 
support of collective bargaining remains controversial, and the need to balance 
this right with the necessity to protect the community from danger to life, 
health, and safety11 is very much a live issue.  
This paper examines the ILO principles of collective bargaining for essential 
public service employees as these principles emerge from the various 
Conventions and Recommendations of the ILO and the commentary of its 
supervisory bodies.12 The first section reviews the core ILO Conventions that 
protect the collective bargaining rights of workers, including public sector 
workers. Thereafter, the paper considers international labour standards 
concerning collective bargaining, dispute settlement and the right of unionised 
public sector employees to withdraw their services as part of bargaining. 
Particular attention is devoted to ILO standards concerning essential public 
sector employees and police officers, a topic that has remained largely at the 
<http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/publication 
/wcms_087931.pdf>. 
8 ILO, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: A Way Forward, above n 3, 187 [389], 
referring to the ILO’s Committee of Freedom of Association. As noted below (see text 
accompanying notes 69–70), the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations has made comments to the same effect.   
9 International Labour Organisation, Public Emergency Services: Social Dialogue in a Changing 
Environment (January 2003) 101 <http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2002 
/102B09_313_engl.pdf> (Public Emergency Services). 
10 Ibid 100. 
11 This represents the ILO’s ‘threshold’ test in determining whether or when the rights of essential 
services workers to bargain and to strike can be limited or even prohibited. 
12 Namely, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
and the Committee on Freedom of Association.  
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fringe of labour law literature. Finally, focusing on the position of essential 
public employees and police officers under the Australian labour relations 
system, the article examines the degree to which Australian law complies with 
ILO standards.  
II PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE 
FUNDAMENTAL ILO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
CONVENTIONS  
The core ILO Conventions that protect the collective bargaining rights of all 
workers, including public sector employees, are the Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No 98) (‘Convention No 98’),13 and 
the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention, 1948 (No 87) (‘Convention No 87’).14 These Conventions are 
often described as the cornerstone documents in international labour law on 
freedom of association, establishing the architecture for this right. Australia has 
ratified each of the Conventions;15 and the principles underlying them are also 
encapsulated in the Declaration.16 In addition, all public sector employees, with 
certain exceptions as discussed below, are covered by the Labour Relations 
(Public Service) Convention, 1978 (No 151) (‘Convention No 151’),17 and the 
Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No 154) (‘Convention No 154’).18 
Convention No 98, adopted by the ILO to supplement certain aspects of 
Convention No 87, has three central objectives. These are (i) the protection of 
workers against anti-union discrimination; (ii) protection against interference 
with the internal affairs of workers’ and employers’ representative 
organisations; and (iii) the promotion of collective bargaining.19 Importantly, 
Convention No 98 has since been supplemented by Convention No 151 and by 
Convention No 154, the latter of which extends the right to collective 
13 ILO, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 1949, above n 2. 
14 ILO, Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
(ILO Convention 87), opened for signature 9 July 1948, 68 UNTS 17 (entered into force 4 July 
1950).  
15 Rosemary Owens, Joellen Riley and Jill Murray, The Law of Work (Oxford University Press, 
2nd ed, 2011) 533. Australia ratified the Conventions on 28 February 1973. 
16 ILO, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, above n 4. 
17 ILO, Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention (ILO Convention 151), opened for 
signature 7 June 1978, 1218 UNTS 87 (entered into force 25 February 1981). 
18 ILO, Convention concerning the Promotion of Collective Bargaining, above n 1. 
19 ILO, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: A Way Forward, above n 3, 75. 
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bargaining to all employees in public administration.20 A state which ratifies 
Convention No 154 is obligated to promote collective bargaining in both the 
private and public sector, and allows only to the public sector the fixing of 
special modalities of application of the Convention by national laws or 
practice.21 Convention No 151 also provides protection to public employees 
against acts of anti-union discrimination and interference by public authorities, 
essential to the right to organise and freedom of association. By extension, it 
protects collective bargaining.22 
The relationship between these instruments and the ILO’s fundamental 
standards on freedom of association and collective bargaining is clear. In its 
recent General Survey on collective bargaining rights in the public service,23 
the Committee of Experts noted that it had repeatedly highlighted the 
connection between promotion of the right to organise and to bargain 
collectively, and the development of human potential, economic growth, social 
justice and sustainable relationships. It had also highlighted the relevance of 
this right to achieving the objective of ‘decent work’. The Committee further 
noted that it had highlighted these matters ‘particularly during times of 
economic crisis’.24  
All of the above Conventions allow member states to determine whether, and 
to what extent, their guarantees apply to ‘the armed forces and the police’.25 
There are two important observations to be made here. The first is that, although 
these provisions allow for the possible exclusion of police, they are clearly not 
binding on member states. Second, in Australia, as elsewhere, police officers 
are subject to the same labour relations systems that are applicable to other 
20 See art 1 of Convention No 151 and Convention No 154. Convention No 98 excluded from its 
scope public sector employees engaged in the administration of the state.  
21 Gernigon, Odero and Guido, above n 7, 47. 
22 ILO, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: A Way Forward, above n 3, 75; ILO, Public 
Emergency Services, above n 9, 92.  
23 ILO, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: A Way Forward, above n 3, 6. See further, 
International Labour Organisation, Manual on Collective Bargaining and Dispute Resolution 
in the Public Service (2011) <http://www.ilo.org/sector/Resources/training-materials/WCMS_ 
180600/lang--en/index.htm> (Manual on Collective Bargaining). 
24 ILO, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: A Way Forward, above n 3, 6. 
25 ILO, Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
(ILO Convention 87), above 14, art 9; ILO, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention 1949, above n 2, art 5; ILO, Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention (ILO 
Convention 151), above 17, art 1; ILO, Convention concerning the Promotion of Collective 
Bargaining, above n 1, art 1. The Conventions include a similar type of exclusion provision for 
those public sector workers directly engaged in the administration of the state and those in high-
level or confidential provisions. 
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employees.26 Thus, as will be seen, for police members operating under 
Australia’s current national labour relations system, the bargaining regime 
makes no distinction between police officers and other employees.27 It can 
therefore be assumed that the guarantees concerning collective bargaining 
applicable to public sector employees apply equally to police officers.28 
III INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS CONCERNING 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
The right of trade unions and workers’ organisations to bargain freely with 
employers is reflected in article 4 of Convention No 98, which provides that 
measures shall be taken to promote voluntary negotiation between the parties 
and their organisations, with a view to the regulation of employment conditions 
by means of collective agreements. According to the Committee on Freedom 
of Association, the voluntary negotiation of collective agreements, and the 
autonomy of the bargaining parties, constitute essential elements of freedom of 
association, and trade unions should have the right, through collective 
bargaining, to seek to improve the employment conditions of those they 
represent.29  
The Committee has stated that nothing in article 4 places a duty on a 
government to enforce collective bargaining by compulsory means with a given 
organisation, and that such interference would clearly alter the nature of 
26 See Giuseppe Carabetta, ‘Police Bargaining Disputes and Third-Party Intervention in 
Australia: Which Way Forward?’ (2013) 18(1) Deakin Law Review 67, nn 11, 13. While 
Australia is among only a minority of countries that grants police officers full industrial rights 
enjoyed by other workers (see ILO, Public Emergency Services, above n 9, 95–6), the 
Committee of Experts has recently acknowledged that in a significant number of member 
countries legislation implementing Convention No. 151 also applies to police officers: ILO, 
Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: A Way Forward, above n 3.  
27 The only modification to this scheme for police is in relation to the exclusion from bargaining 
of certain operational matters: see Giuseppe Carabetta, ‘Fair Work and the Future of Police 
Industrial Regulation in Australia’ (2011) 24(3) Australian Journal of Labour Law 260 (‘Fair 
Work’). 
28 A similar approach has been applied in other contexts. See, for example, Re an Interest 
Arbitration between the Durham Regional Police Association and the Regional Municipality of 
Durham Police Services Board (Preliminary Award, Paula Knopf, 13 July 2007) [76] 
<http://www.policearbitration.on.ca/content/stellent/groups/public/@abcs/@www/@opac/doc
uments/awards/07-008.pdf>. 
29 International Labour Organisation, Freedom of Association — Digest of Decisions and 
Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO 
(November 2006) International Labour Organisation, [925] <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5 
/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/publication/wcms_090632.pdf> (‘Freedom 
of Association — 2006 Digest’). 
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bargaining.30 Collective bargaining, if it is to achieve its objectives, must be 
voluntary and not entail recourse to compulsion.31 Accordingly, public 
authorities are required to refrain from any interference which would restrict 
workers’ rights to bargain freely, except in compelling and justifiable 
circumstances.32 Thus, the supervisory bodies have accepted the imposition of 
certain sanctions in the case of bargaining conduct which is contrary to good 
faith principles, but only where such sanctions are not disproportionate.33 
As will be explained in under heading IV below, the supervisory bodies have 
emphasised that third party machinery in support of bargaining,34 should also 
be voluntary in nature and accepted by the parties. The Committee of Experts 
appointed by the ILO’s Governing Body has stressed that legal systems 
providing (for example) for conciliation and mediation by a ministerial body 
once a specified period in the bargaining process has expired, and without a 
request from either party, are not, in principle, in conformity with this 
standard.35 The Committee has further emphasised that while systems 
enshrining voluntary arbitration are allowable, compulsory arbitration is 
allowable only in certain exceptional cases, such as in the public sector if 
negotiations have failed and conciliation and/or mediation procedures have 
been exhausted, or, as seen below, in the context of truly essential public 
services.36 
30 Ibid [927].   
31 Ibid [926]–[927]. Following this general approach, it cannot therefore be deduced from the 
ILO’s principles on collective bargaining that there is any formal obligation to negotiate or form 
an agreement, although such an obligation is imposed in certain legal systems: Gernigon, Odero 
and Guido, above n 7, 41, n 5. 
32 International Labour Organisation, Freedom of Association — 2006 Digest, above n 29, [881], 
[994], [1024]–[1042]. 
33 Gernigon, Odero and Guido, above n 7, 41. For example, when examining in one case 
legislation which provided that the employer was obliged to pay workers for days they had been 
on strike, in cases where the strike had occurred because the employer had not responded to the 
demands and because conciliation had been abandoned, the Committee on Freedom of 
Association considered that the sanctions were disproportionate: ibid. 
34 Notably, conciliation, mediation and arbitration.  
35 The Committee notes that such systems involve administrative or judicial intervention that has 
not been requested by the parties, which ‘opens the door to potential interference or pressure 
on one or other of the parties, depending on the Government’s political stance.’: ILO, Collective 
Bargaining in the Public Service: A Way Forward, above n 3, 172. 
36 Ibid 172. 
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A Principles Concerning Public Sector Bargaining 
The ILO, through its conventions and recommendations and the work of its 
supervisory bodies, notably the Committee of Experts and Committee on 
Freedom of Association, has established the following principles pertaining to 
public sector collective bargaining: 
1. As part of the positive duty upon Member States to promote the 
principles of freedom of association, all employees of public 
undertakings and autonomous public institutions must have a right to 
collective bargaining.37 However, as mentioned above, a Member State 
is entitled to exclude certain groups of public sector employees — 
namely police officers and members of the armed forces, public sector 
workers engaged directly in the administration of the state, and those 
in high-level positions or whose work involves confidential 
information — although these exclusions are clearly optional for 
Member States.38 
2. Public sector employees are to enjoy the same civil and political rights 
as other workers, rights that  are fundamental to the normal exercise of 
freedom of association. Their enjoyment is subject only to those 
justifiable restrictions pertinent to the public sector status of the worker 
and the nature of the worker’s functions.39 
3. The imposition of compulsory arbitration (at the initiative of the 
authorities, or one of the parties, or by law) is an exception to the 
fundamental right of public sector workers, embodied in the respective 
ILO Conventions and outlined above, to engage in free and voluntary 
collective bargaining.40 Compulsory arbitration is considered ‘[o]ne of 
the most radical forms of intervention by the authorities in collective 
bargaining’.41 
4. Restrictions on, or the removal of, the general right of public sector 
workers to collective bargaining, and its substitution by compulsory 
37 Ibid [885]–[903]. 
38 See text accompanying n 22.  
39 Michael Lynk, Expert Affidavit on Essential Services (9 February 2012) Law of Work, 7–8 
<http://lawofwork.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Lynk-Expert.pdf>, referring to art 9 of 
Convention No 151. 
40 ILO, Freedom of Association — 2006 Digest, above n 29, [992]–[994].  
41 Gernigon, Odero and Guido, above n 7, 44, quoted in Lynk, above n 39, 8.  
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arbitration, can only be justified (other than in certain temporary 
situations)42 in the following circumstances:  
• where the employees are police officers and members of the 
armed forces, public sector workers engaged directly in the 
administration of the state, and those engaged in high-level or 
confidential positions; or  
• where the employees are engaged in ‘ essential services’ within 
the strict meaning of the term (see below).  
Arbitration which is voluntary — that is, accepted by both parties — is 
always allowable.43 
5. To comply with the general right of public sector employees to 
collective bargaining, the term ‘essential services’ is to be given a strict 
and purposive meaning. Essential services are those ‘the interruption of 
which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole of 
part of the population’.44 A broader or more elastic definition of essential 
services would be incompatible with the fundamental right of public 
sector employees to collective bargaining.45 
6. In order to gain and retain the parties’ confidence in collective 
bargaining, any compulsory arbitration system should be truly 
independent and its outcomes should not be predetermined by legislative 
requirements.46 
B Special Characteristics of Public Service 
Aside from the above principles, there are a number of additional standards 
stemming from the special characteristics of public service. These special 
characteristics, which raise specific problems for public sector bargaining, are 
outlined in a leading study by Bernard Gernigon, Alberto Odero and Horacio 
Guido.47 First, public servants are often subject to one or more sets of uniform 
conditions of service. These contain exhaustive regulations covering the rights 
42 See under heading IV, below.  
43 Gernigon, Odero and Guido, above n 7, 52. 
44 ILO, Freedom of Association — 2006 Digest, above n 29, [994].  
45 Lynk, above n 39, 8.  
46 Ibid, referring to the ILO, Freedom of Association — 2006 Digest, above n 29, [995]. 
47 Gernigon, Odero and Guido, above n 7, 48–50. For a detailed discussion of these special 
features of public service that can create difficulties for collective bargaining, see ILO, 
Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: A Way Forward, above n 3, 78–9.  
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and obligations of the employees, thereby leaving little room for negotiation. 
This is certainly the case in the essential public services sector,48 particularly in 
police services where an exhaustive ‘code’ of regulations characteristically 
covers, inter alia, conditions of service.49  
A further difficulty is that many management decisions concerning the pay and 
employment conditions of public employees are determined by a political 
process in which budgetary questions are decided by parliament, and affected 
interest groups try to influence outcomes.50 These bodies are not always the 
direct employers, and their decisions must take the financial situation of the 
country and the general public interest into account. Moreover, the duration of 
collective agreements does not always coincide with the budgetary cycle, which 
can cause further difficulties.51 
These problems are compounded by other issues such as the determination of 
negotiating parties at different levels of government, as well as problems in 
defining the scope of collective bargaining in a public sector context.52 The 
latter poses particular difficulties in a policing context when it is necessary to 
distinguish between operational matters, such as decisions relating to the 
deployment of officers, and matters pertaining to working conditions, such as 
occupational health and safety.53 The ILO points out that in order to avoid such 
problems, laws and regulations applying to public services in many countries 
prohibit bargaining on certain aspects of public service.54  
Because of these issues, and so that account can be taken of different national 
systems and procedures, both Convention No 151 and Convention No 154 
allow for ‘special modalities’ of application for collective bargaining in the 
public service. These modalities might be fixed by national laws or 
regulations.55 According to the ILO, such modalities could include:  
48 ILO, Public Emergency Services, above n 9, 99. 
49 Carabetta, Fair Work, above n 27, 1.  
50 ILO, Manual on Collective Bargaining, above n 23, 50; ILO, Collective Bargaining in the 
Public Service: A Way Forward, above n 3, 119; ILO, Public Emergency Services, above n 9, 
99. 
51 Gernigon, Odero and Guido, above n 7, 48. 
52 ILO, Manual on Collective Bargaining, above n 23. 
53 ILO, Public Emergency Services, above n 9, 98–9. The ILO itself cites, as an example, the 
decision as to the ‘number of personnel assigned to a fire truck or police [patrol] car’, arguing 
that it not clear whether this is a policy matter or an employment matter. 
54 Ibid 99.  
55 ILO, Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention (ILO Convention 151), above 17, art 7; 
ILO, Convention concerning the Promotion of Collective Bargaining, above n 1, art 1(3). 
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• parliament or the competent budgetary authority setting upper or lower 
limits for wage negotiations, or establishing an overall budgetary package 
within which parties may negotiate monetary or standard-setting clauses; 
• legislative provisions giving the financial authorities the right to 
participate in collective bargaining alongside the direct employer; 
• harmonisation of an agreed bargaining system with a statutory 
framework … ; [and] 
• the initial determination by the legislative authority of directives 
regarding the subjects that can be negotiated, at what levels collective 
bargaining should take place or who the negotiating parties may be. The 
determination of directives should be preceded by consultations with the 
organisations of public servants.56  
In relation to the first of these special modalities,57 the Committee of Experts 
has stated that where Parliament or the budgetary authority establishes such 
limits or an overall budget package for bargaining negotiations, they must 
nonetheless ‘leave a significant role to collective bargaining’. Moreover, it 
is essential that ‘workers and their organizations be able to participate fully 
and meaningfully in designing this overall bargaining framework’.58 This 
implies in particular that ‘they must have access to all the financial, budgetary 
and other data required, in a transparent manner’.59  
The Committee of Freedom of Association has similarly stated that:  
56 ILO, Manual on Collective Bargaining, above n 23, 50, drawing on Shauna Olney and Marleen 
Rueda, Convention No 154: Promoting Collective Bargaining (2005) International Labour 
Organisation, 14 <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/gurn/00349.pdf>.  
57 This modality has, especially in the context of the recent financial crisis, hitherto been the main 
focus of the ILO’s supervisory bodies. 
58 ILO, Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, (Report No 3, International Labour 
Conference — 81st Session, 1994) [263] <http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/P/09661/ 
09661(1994-81-4B).pdf> (‘Freedom of Association’), quoted in Gernigon, Odero and Guido, 
above n 7, 49 (emphasis in original). 
59 Ibid [263]; ILO, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: A Way Forward, above n 3, 121. 
This is not, however, the case of legislative provisions which, on grounds of economic 
stabilisation, impose a specific percentage increase, thus ruling out any possibility of 
bargaining. During periods of prolonged and widespread economic stagnation the Committee 
of Experts requires that the authorities ‘should give preference as far as possible to collective 
bargaining ...; where the circumstances rule this out, measures of this kind should be limited in 
time and protect the standard of living of the workers most affected...[and thus] reach a fair and 
reasonable compromise between the need to preserve as far as possible the autonomy of the 
parties and [budgetary difficulties]’: ILO, Freedom of Association [264]. 
                                                 
286 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 19 NO 2 
In so far as the income of public enterprises and bodies depends on state 
budgets, it would not be objectionable — after wide discussion and 
consultation between the concerned employers’ and employees’ 
organizations in a system having the confidence of the parties — for wage 
ceilings to be fixed in state budgetary laws, and neither would it be a matter 
for criticism that the Ministry of Finance prepare a report prior to the 
commencement of collective bargaining with a view to ensuring respect of 
such ceilings.60 
It is important to note that before ceilings are established, provision must be 
made to ensure that the employers’ and employees’ organisations be consulted 
and be able to express their points of view to the authority for assessing the 
financial consequences of draft agreements.61 This threshold requirement for 
consultation with the bargaining parties is in fact a common requirement for 
any similar types of interventions by the authorities.62 Nonetheless, 
‘notwithstanding any opinion submitted by the financial authorities, the parties 
to collective bargaining should be able to conclude an agreement freely’.63  
The last point relates to the Committee of Experts’ examination of the impact 
on the collective bargaining rights of public sector workers of economic and 
other grave crises (such as wars or natural disasters), and the economic 
stabilisation policies of different countries.64 These policies have included, inter 
alia, measures to cut or freeze wages, or to confine rises within certain limits, 
or prohibit outright the indexation of wages to the cost of living, thereby 
limiting voluntary collective bargaining and the autonomy of the bargaining 
parties.65 The consistent position of the Committee of Experts in addressing 
such problems has been that collective agreements must be respected and that 
limitations on the content of future agreements, particularly in relation to 
wages, imposed in these circumstances are admissible only on the following 
two conditions:  
60 ILO, Freedom of Association — 2006 Digest, above n 29, [1036].  
61 Ibid [1037]. 
62 See generally, ILO, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: A Way Forward, above n 3, 
Part II. 
63 ILO, Freedom of Association — 2006 Digest, above n 29, [1037]; Gernigon, Odero and Guido, 
above n 7, 49–50, quoting from the International Labour Organisation, Freedom of Association 
— Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the 
Governing Body of the ILO (November 1996). .  
64 ILO, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: A Way Forward, above n 3, 123–4. 
65 Ibid. 
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1. that they have been subject to prior consultations with workers’ and 
employers’ organisations; and  
2. that they meet the following conditions: ‘(i) they are applied as an 
exceptional measure; (ii) they are limited to the extent necessary; (iii) they 
do not exceed a reasonable period; and (iv) they are accompanied by 
safeguards to protect effectively the standard of living of the workers 
concerned, in particular those who are likely to be the most affected.’66  
IV DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THIRD PARTY 
INTERVENTION 
A The Voluntary Nature of Bodies for the Resolution 
of Collective Bargaining (Interests) Disputes 
As mentioned above, the ILO’s principles on collective bargaining clearly 
favour dispute settlement procedures whereby the parties themselves find a 
solution to their dispute. The ILO acknowledges that governments, and finance 
ministries in particular, have a legitimate interest in the impact of public sector 
wage determinations; accordingly, ‘there must be some discourse between 
political and labour relations mechanisms’.67 Further, if a breakdown in public 
sector bargaining leads to a disruption in the delivery of public services, the 
authorities will obviously be interested parties. Nonetheless, if the labour 
relations system is to be effective in achieving its objectives, including its goals 
of public sector efficiency and equity, then it ‘must be given space to do its 
work’.68  
Accordingly, the ILO’s supervisory bodies have considered that, although third 
party mechanisms such as conciliation and/or arbitration can facilitate 
collective bargaining, legislation establishing procedures to facilitate 
bargaining and settle collective bargaining disputes must respect the autonomy 
of the parties.69 The Committee of Freedom of Association has emphasised that, 
whatever type of machinery is implemented, its first objective should be to 
encourage, by all possible means, free and voluntary collective bargaining, 
66 Ibid 124; ILO, Freedom of Association, above n 58, [260]. 
67 ILO, Manual on Collective Bargaining, above n 23, 11–12.  
68 Ibid 11.  
69 ILO, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: A Way Forward, above n 3, 157 [389], 
referring to the ILO’s Committee of Freedom of Association. As noted under heading IV, the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations has made 
comments to the same effect.  
                                                 
288 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 19 NO 2 
‘while establishing a legal framework and an administrative structure to which 
they may have recourse, on a voluntary basis and by mutual agreement, to 
facilitate the conclusion of a collective agreement’.70 It points out that the mere 
intervention of a neutral, independent third party, in which the parties have 
confidence, is often enough to break a stalemate which the parties would be 
unable to resolve themselves.71 The Committee notes that the provisions of 
Convention No 154 are of particular relevance in this context, as are the 
Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation, 1951 (No 92), in 
particular its reference to the two essential characteristics of the conciliation 
and arbitration machinery: the joint nature of such machinery (including equal 
representation of employers and employees); and voluntary recourse to 
procedures, which should be free of charge and expeditious.72 
The supervisory bodies admit voluntary conciliation and mediation (as well as 
voluntary arbitration) in accordance with the provisions of the Voluntary 
Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation No 92 which states that: 
‘provision should be made to enable the procedure to be set in motion, either 
on the initiative of any of the parties to the dispute or ex officio by the voluntary 
conciliation Authority’.73 In other words, if these mechanisms are accepted by 
the parties, they pose no problem to the principles of collective bargaining since 
their role is to support bargaining. However, if conciliation and mediation are 
systematically imposed by law, they may, ‘ after a certain time and in 
certain cases’, hamper or even restrict the parties’ collective bargaining 
autonomy to varying degrees, depending on the nature of the process and how 
it is regulated.74 
B The Independence and Impartiality of Procedures 
and Confidence of Parties 
It also follows from article 8 of Convention No 151 that when dispute resolution 
procedures are established by law (rather than by the parties themselves), those 
procedures must be sufficiently independent and impartial to ensure the 
70 ILO, Freedom of Association, above n 58, [247] (emphasis in original). 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. The Committee of Experts has similarly emphasised that in order for such machinery to 
be effective in promoting bargaining, it must be autonomous; accessible; informal; expeditious; 
and consensual — so as to ensure the confidence of the parties: ILO, Collective Bargaining in 
the Public Service: A Way Forward, above n 3, 172–3, 209. 
73 Gernigon, Odero and Guido, above n 7, 44. 
74 ILO, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: A Way Forward, above n 3, 171 (emphasis 
added). 
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confidence of the parties.75 The Committee of Experts observes that, with a 
view to guaranteeing these elements, many legal systems grant dispute 
resolution bodies a large degree of autonomy from the public authorities.76 The 
Committee notes that in some cases, this autonomy is sought when setting 
criteria for the establishment of these bodies: for example, by providing for an 
equal number of employee and employer representatives, and independent 
members.77 In others, provision is made (for example) for independent 
conciliators designated jointly by the parties, or chosen by both chambers of 
parliament from a pool of labour law experts.78  
The Committee of Experts emphasises, however, that whether a system can 
guarantee the impartial and independent resolution of bargaining disputes in 
accordance with Convention No 151, depends on its capacity to ensure the 
confidence of the parties in practice. The Committee of Experts accordingly 
underlines the fact that a system for the resolution of public sector collective 
bargaining disputes which provides for conciliation, mediation or arbitration 
bodies that are administrative in nature and composition does not meet the 
requirements of the Convention. It fails to meet Convention requirements with 
regard to the independence and impartiality of procedures, and their ability to 
secure the confidence of the parties.79  
C Role of Arbitration in the Resolution of Bargaining 
Disputes 
The ILO regards arbitration as the next step after mediation in the ‘dispute 
resolution chain’,80 and as a reserve measure. In voluntary arbitration the 
parties, realising that their own efforts will not resolve a bargaining dispute, 
75 Ibid 173. The ILO, while not itself prescribing a specific model for such procedures, notes the 
variety of approaches applied internationally, including the use of specialised labour courts, 
ordinary courts and labour commissions, to name but a few. 
76 Ibid. 
77 This is common practice in a number of police jurisdictions. See Ian McAndrew, ‘An 
Examination of Police Pay Setting Systems with Particular Consideration of the Right to Strike 
and of Models of Arbitration’ (Unpublished Briefing Paper Prepared for the New Zealand 
Police Association, NZ Mediators, 24 October 2006). In Australia, an example is the Northern 
Territory Police Arbitral Tribunal, whose membership consists of an independent chairperson, 
the Minister’s nominee, and the Police Association’s nominee.  
78 ILO, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: A Way Forward, above n 3, 173.  
79 Ibid. The Committee of Experts has also underscored the importance of dispute settlement 
procedures and bodies (voluntary conciliation, mediation and arbitration) being designed 
appropriately to settle disputes fairly and speedily. 
80 See ILO, Manual on Collective Bargaining, above n 23, 188–9. Limitations of space prohibit 
a detailed discussion here of the relationship between conciliation, mediation and arbitration.  
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voluntarily agree to place the issues dividing them before a neutral third party 
such as an individual arbitrator or arbitration board. The arbitrator is 
empowered — either via a collective agreement or by statute — to consider 
evidence and argument and then make a final, binding determination.81 The 
ILO points out that, while arbitration is often seen by all parties as a preferable 
alternative to the exercise of power as a method of breaking a bargaining 
stalemate, a particular advantage of voluntary arbitration is that the process will 
generally not be called into question precisely because it has been jointly agreed 
to.82  
Voluntary arbitration is always legitimate and in full conformity with the ILO’s 
principles of voluntary and free collective bargaining. This is not true, however, 
of compulsory arbitration, imposed either directly by law, or by administrative 
decision or at the initiative of one party, except in specified circumstances.83 
This is because compulsory arbitration can rob the collective bargaining 
process of its vitality and equity. It is, therefore, in the ILO’s view, an option 
that must be approached with caution.84 The Committee of Experts points out 
that the expression ‘compulsory arbitration’ can give rise to a degree of 
confusion. If the term refers to the compulsory effects of arbitration resorted to 
voluntarily by the parties, this does not create a problem, since the parties 
should be deemed to accept a binding decision by an arbitrator or arbitration 
board that they have freely chosen. The real issue arises in the case of 
compulsory arbitration which the authorities may impose in a bargaining 
dispute — either at the request of one party or at their own initiative — the 
effects of which are compulsory for the parties.85  
The ILO supervisory bodies have stated repeatedly that the use of compulsory 
arbitration is not easily reconcilable with the principle of voluntary bargaining 
established by Convention No 98.86 Depending on the model, the public 
administrative or legislative authorities, either intervening on their own 
initiative or on the request of one of the parties to a dispute, may be: authorised 
81 Ibid 118. This accords with ILO, Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation 
1951 (No 92), (International Labour Conference — 34th Session, 1951) art 6, which provides: 
‘If a dispute has been submitted to arbitration for final settlement with the consent of all parties 
concerned, the latter should be encouraged to abstain from strikes and lockouts while the 
arbitration is in progress and to accept the arbitration award.’  
82 Ibid 120. 
83 ILO, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: A Way Forward, above n 3, 180. The 
specified circumstances referred to are discussed below. 
84 ILO, Manual on Collective Bargaining, above n 23, 124. 
85 ILO, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: A Way Forward, above n 3, 181. 
86 Gernigon, Odero and Guido, above n 7, 27–8. 
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either to endeavour to resolve the dispute themselves; to submit the dispute to 
designated bodies (such as a conciliation board or arbitral body); or, to refer the 
dispute to the judicial authorities. In the opinion of the Committee of Experts, 
each of these approaches raises problems of compatibility with ILO standards.87 
In contrast, certain legal systems provide that, once conciliation between the 
parties has been unsuccessful, the dispute is referred to a designated 
independent body entrusted with issuing recommendations which, after a 
certain period, become enforceable if neither party has challenged them. The 
Committee regards this type of model as compatible with the relevant 
standards, as long as the legal period referred to is reasonable.88  
In any event, the supervisory bodies allow recourse to compulsory arbitration 
as an exception to bargaining in certain specified circumstances, particularly 
where the model is the product of consent between the parties.89 Importantly 
for present purposes, one of these exceptions is the case of bargaining disputes 
involving essential services employees in the strict sense of that term.90 As will 
be seen below, the Committee of Experts permits compulsory arbitration for 
these particular employees, to counterbalance the restriction or removal of the 
right to strike in support of bargaining.91  
Compulsory arbitration is especially prevalent amongst police and other 
emergency service workers as a trade-off for the right to strike.92 The rationale 
for the availability of compulsory arbitration in this context is two-fold: to 
safeguard the workers’ industrial interests; and to protect the community from 
the harmful effects of workplace disputes. In the view of the ILO, a good 
example of the policy considerations at stake is captured in the following 
provision from a police and fire arbitration statute in the United States: 
It is the public policy of this State that in public police and fire departments, 
where the right of employees to strike is by law prohibited, it is requisite to 
the high morale of such employees and the efficient operation of such 
87 ILO, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: A Way Forward, above n 3, 181–2. 
88 Ibid 182. 
89 ILO, Manual on Collective Bargaining, above n 23, 124. 
90 The others being in cases involving public administration; in the event of a national emergency; 
or where, after protracted and fruitless negotiations, it is obvious that the stalemate will not be 
resolved. Compulsory arbitration is also allowable where it is provided for in a collective 
agreement as a process for the resolution of disputes: Gernigon, Odero and Guido, above n 7, 
44.  
91 Even here, however, an important caveat is that arbitration should be performed by impartial 
bodies and the parties permitted to participate at all stages of the procedure: ILO, Manual on 
Collective Bargaining, above n 23, 125. 
92 See ILO, Public Emergency Services, above n 9, 101–2; McAndrew, above n 77.  
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departments to afford an alternate, expeditious, effective and binding 
procedure for the resolution of disputes, and to that end the provisions of this 
[A]ct, providing for compulsory arbitration, shall be liberally construed.93 
On the other hand, as noted earlier, the ILO has pointed out that, given that the 
blanket prohibition of strikes is less frequent than it was in the past in these 
areas of public service, it is worth considering the possibility of avoiding 
absolute bans on strikes.94 This concept, suggesting the need for a proportional 
analysis, is examined in the following sections. 
V STRIKES AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF SERVICES 
The right of unionised employees to strike through the peaceful withdrawal 
of services in order to defend their economic and social interests has been 
widely accepted as one of the pillars of the freedom to associate, along with the 
right to organise and the right to collectively bargain.95 The right is regarded 
by the ILO as an ‘intrinsic corollary’ to collective bargaining, and, as a general 
rule, also holds true for public sector collective bargaining.96 It has been 
described ‘as an indispensable component of a democratic society’, and has 
been ‘justified as a countervailing force to the power of capital’.97  
ILO instruments do not expressly refer to the right to strike in support of 
collective bargaining.98 Nonetheless, the Committee on Freedom of 
Association and the Committee of Experts have long recognised the right to 
strike99 as an essential means available to workers and their organisations for 
93 ILO, Manual on Collective Bargaining, above n 23, 125, quoting from the Compulsory 
Arbitration of Labor Disputes in Police and Fire Departments Act 312 of 1969, 423 MCL 
(1969).  
94 ILO, Public Emergency Services, above n 9, 103. 
95 Lynk, above n 39, 9.  
96 ILO, Freedom of Association — 2006 Digest, above n 29, [523]; ILO, Manual on Collective 
Bargaining, above n 23, 133. 
97 Fumane ’Malebona Khabo, ‘Collective Bargaining and Labour Disputes Resolution — Is 
SADC Meeting the Challenge?’ (Issues Paper No 30, International Labour Organisation — 
Sub-Regional Office for Southern Africa, March 2008) 17 <http://www.ilo.org 
/public/english/region/afpro/harare/download/issues_paper_30.pdf>; citing an earlier source 
quoting from Sir Otto Kahn-Freund and Bob Hepple. 
98 The right to strike is expressly referred to in the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights via art 8(1)(d), as part of its umbrella of fundamental human rights. See 
Shae McCrystal, The Right to Strike in Australia (Federation Press, 2010) ch 2.  
99 The principles of the two bodies contain no set definition of strike action; however, certain 
types of strike action falling short of total work stoppages (occupation of the workplace, 
picketing, ‘glow slows’ or ‘working to rule’ strikes), have been accepted by the Committee on 
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the protection of their interests. McCrystal explains that the Committee of 
Freedom of Association recognises the right to strike as a component of the 
principles of freedom of association as expressed within ILO standards.100 
Furthermore, for those Member States that have ratified Convention No 87, the 
right is taken by the Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of 
Association to be a component of the express protections of trade union 
freedoms under the Convention.101  
The ILO has explained that the reason for regarding the right to strike as an 
integral part of collective bargaining is that, without it, ‘bargaining risks being 
inconsequential — a dead letter’.102 According to the ILO, industrial action 
(including, inter alia, all forms of work stoppages, go-slows and lockouts) is 
the ultimate weapon in persuading the parties to bargain: 
Industrial action, or the threat of industrial action, plays a key part in an 
effective bargaining process. Where conflicting interests need to be 
reconciled, knowing that the other party has the capacity and the right to 
exercise power helps focus the negotiators. This obliges them to take the other 
party seriously and reach a compromise settlement. In this important sense, 
industrial action is functional to collective bargaining.103 
However, industrial action comes at an obvious price: to workers, to employers, 
to governments and to the broader community. This is especially so in the public 
sector, where disruptions to social services will nearly always adversely affect 
the public. Accordingly, the right to strike should be used only as a last resort 
when collective bargaining and existing third party mechanisms have been 
unsuccessful.104 It is also true that, in practice, the right is regulated by 
Freedom of Association, provided they are conducted peacefully: Bernard Gernigon, Alberto 
Odero and Horacio Guido, ILO Principles Concerning the Right to Strike (1 January 2000) 
International Labour Organisation, 44 <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
ed_norm/---normes/documents/publication/wcms_087987.pdf>.  
100 McCrystal, above n 98, 22–3. 
101 Ibid 23. 
102 International Labour Organisation, ‘Your Voice at Work: Global Report under the Follow-up 
to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work’ (Report, International 
Labour Organisation, 25 May 2000) [101] <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/ 
groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_publ_9221115046 
_en.pdf> (‘Your Voice at Work’), quoted in Lynk, above n 39, 10. 
103 ILO, Manual on Collective Bargaining, above n 23, 33.  
104 ILO, ‘Your Voice at Work’, above n 102, [101]. The Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration 
Recommendation 1951 (No 92) encourages parties who have agreed to submit to conciliation 
and arbitration to desist from striking while these processes are on foot ([4], [6]) and indicates 
that none of its provisions may be construed as ‘limiting, in any way whatsoever, the right to 
strike ([7])’.  
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procedural and other limitations in many jurisdictions;105 in particular, many 
jurisdictions limit the capacity of ‘essential services’ and other public sector 
workers to engage in industrial action.106 On the other hand, according to the 
ILO, the fact that strikes, by definition, take place in conflict situations and may 
cause major inconvenience should not detract from the obligation to respect and 
safeguard the principles on which they are based.107  
The point is increasingly stressed that public emergency services strikes, in 
particular, inflict more harm on the community than the employer, interrupting 
essential services which the state provides to the community.108 In this context, 
strikes and other forms of industrial action may simply be unacceptable. 
Accordingly, while the right to withdraw services in pursuit of bargaining is 
well established, ILO standards provide that this right does not encompass 
essential services whose interruption would threaten the life, personal safety or 
health of all or part of the population.109 These workers may be denied the 
possibility of engaging in industrial action, provided they have access to 
adequate compensatory safeguards. However, this has not prevented certain 
countries110 from maintaining the right to strike even in relation to the public 
services, the aim being to keep the bargaining dynamic alive even in this 
sensitive employment area.111 
In their various decisions and commentaries, the two ILO supervisory 
committees have established a substantial body of principles regarding how 
the right to strike may be exercised. As a core feature of the freedom to 
associate, the right to strike is to be made available to all private and public 
105 The Committee of Freedom of Association allows governments to legislate reasonable pre-
requisites for a lawful strike, such as requirements for conciliation and arbitration, strike notice, 
secret ballots and a majority vote. See ILO, Freedom of Association — 2006 Digest, above n 
29, [547] et seq. 
106 Breen Creighton, William J Ford and Richard J Mitchell, Labour Law: Text and Materials 
(Law Book Co, 2nd ed, 1993) 1148. In its Public Emergency Services report, the ILO identifies 
only a handful of countries where police officers have a right to engage in industrial action in 
support of bargaining: above n 9, 102–3. 
107 ILO, Your Voice at Work, above n 104, [101]. 
108 ILO, Public Emergency Services, above n 9, 100–1.  
109 ILO, Freedom of Association — 2006 Digest, above n 29, 581. Nor does the right, as a rule, 
encompass public servants engaged in the administration of the state, nor situations of national 
emergency. See McCrystal, above n 100, 33–6; and see also the discussion in the section that 
follows in Part VA, The Right to Strike in the Public Sector. 
110 For example, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland: ILO, Manual on Collective 
Bargaining, above n 23, 133. 
111 Ibid. As noted above, even in the context of public emergency services, including police 
services, blanket prohibition of strikes is nowadays less frequent than in the past: see text 
accompanying n 9. 
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sector employees, except those working in the specifically designated 
occupations or circumstances noted above. The right to strike is not an 
absolute right. Nevertheless, because of the fundamental importance of the 
right to strike, the exceptions to it — including those relating to public and 
essential services — must be narrowly and precisely defined so that its purpose 
is not frustrated.112 
A The Right to Strike in the Public Sector 
To reiterate, because of the fundamental importance of the right to strike, 
prohibitions or restrictions on its exercise need to be justified. The Committee 
of Experts advocates that the right should be limited only in relation to: (i) 
public sector employees exercising authority in the name of the state;113 and (ii) 
public sector employees performing essential services within the strict meaning 
of the term.114 Furthermore, as a result of Article 9 of Convention No 87,115 the 
Committee on Freedom of Association has refused to find an objection to 
legislation which denies the right to strike to the armed forces and the police.116 
As with the exceptions relating to collective bargaining, a government is not 
compelled to prohibit or restrict the freedom to strike for these categories of 
112 Ibid 139; Lynk, above n 39, 13.  
113 Gernigon, Odero and Guido point out that the guidelines for determining the category of 
public sector worker who may be so excluded no longer emanate from national laws, but from 
the nature of the functions performed. Thus, while the right to strike of (for example) officials 
in ministries or those working in the administration of justice and the judiciary may be subject 
to restrictions or even prohibitions, certain public servants do not exercise authority in the 
name of the state and are therefore exempt from such restrictions.  Examples of these are public 
servants in state-owned commercial or metropolitan transport undertakings or those 
employed in the education sector: Gernigon, Odero and Guido, ILO Principles Concerning 
the Right to Strike, above n 99, 448–9.  
114 ILO, Manual on Collective Bargaining, above n 23, 139, citing the ILO Freedom of 
Association and Collective Bargaining: General Survey (Report No 3, International Labour 
Conference — 69th Session, 1983) [213]–[214] <http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/ 
P/09661/09661(1983-69-4B).pdf> (‘General Survey’). See also ILO, Freedom of Association, 
above n 58, [158]–[159].  
115 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 
(Convention 87), art 9 provides that ‘[t]he extent to which the guarantees provided for in this 
Convention shall apply to the armed forces and the police shall be determined by national laws 
or regulations’.  
116 Gernigon, Odero and Guido, ‘ILO Principles Concerning the Right to Strike’, above n 99, 
447. Once again, for present purposes, police officers are treated as being analogous to essential 
public sector employees: see above n 28.  
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public sector workers, but it would not be inconsistent with the ILO’s standards 
on freedom of association for it to do so.117  
As the ability to restrict strike action carries with it the potential for abuse, the 
Committee of Experts stresses that the determination of which public 
employees could have the right to strike restricted, or denied to them, must be 
exercised as a limited and confined exception to the general right.118 The 
Committee has noted that ‘too broad [a] definition of the concept of public 
servant is likely to result in a very wide restriction or even a prohibition of the 
right to strike for these workers’.119 The exercise of restricting access to the 
general right must be minimal and proportional:  
The principle whereby the right to strike may be limited or even prohibited 
in essential services would lose all meaning if national legislation defined 
these services in too broad a manner. As an exception to the general 
principle of the right to strike, the essential services in which this 
principle may be entirely or partly waived should be defined restrictively: 
the Committee therefore considers that essential services are only those 
the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or 
health of the whole or part of the population.120  
Drawing on the jurisprudence and standards established by the two 
Committees, the application of the right to strike in the public sector can 
be characterised as falling into three distinct categories: 
1. The broad and general right to strike, which is the governing rule; 
2. A partial and restricted right to strike; and 
3. An outright prohibition on the right to strike.121 
Lynk makes the important point that, even in a public sector context, a 
government does not, according to ILO standards, have a policy choice as to 
which one of these categories it might wish to apply. Given that the withdrawal 
of services is fundamental to the freedom of association, a decision to restrict 
or prohibit the freedom to strike must be made in a manner that is faithful to the 
protection and guarantee of any significant right. Restrictions or prohibitions 
117 Lynk, above n 39, 14. 
118 Ibid; McCrystal, above n 98.  
119 ILO, ‘Freedom of Association’, above n 58, [158]. 
120 Ibid [159]. See further, ILO, Freedom of Association — 2006 Digest, above n 29, [581].  
121 Lynk, above n 39, 15. 
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on the freedom to strike must be plainly justifiable by the government, and 
strictly proportional to the degree of reasonable and probable danger to the life, 
personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population.122 
B The Right to Strike and Essential Public Services 
For the reasons noted above, namely the potential abuse of the ability to place 
restrictions on strikes, the term ‘essential’ is narrowly defined, encompassing 
only those services where the withdrawal of labour would result in ‘a clear and 
imminent threat’ to the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the 
population.123 Obviously, police and other public emergency services would be 
legitimate essential services under this definition.  
However, the Committee on Freedom of Association has confirmed that the 
concept of essential services in the strict sense is not absolute. Its meaning 
depends largely on a country’s particular circumstances. Further, a non-
essential service (for example, water supply) may become essential if a strike 
lasts beyond a certain time or extends beyond a certain scope, thus endangering 
the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population.124  
According to ILO standards as derived from the jurisprudence of the 
supervisory bodies, a government is clearly entitled to legislate for restrictions 
on, or even the prohibitions of, the right to strike for essential public services 
employees. However, in order to comply with these standards, a government 
would have to ensure that:  
(i) the public services that are targeted for the withdrawal of services 
genuinely meet the definition of essential services in its strict and proper 
sense; 
(ii) the guiding test for the restriction or prohibition of the right to strike 
would be based on the minimal and proportional analysis; 
(iii) the first permissible exception to the broad and general right to 
strike that is to be explored would be a partial and restricted right to strike; 
(iv) the scope for a partial and restricted right to strike is to be drawn as 
purposively as possible in order to establish the minimum amount [sic] of 
122 Ibid.  
123 McCrystal, above n 98, 34, citing ILO, ‘Freedom of Association’, above n 58, [159]; and ILO, 
Freedom of Association — 2006 Digest, above n 29, [581]. 
124 ILO, Freedom of Association — 2006 Digest, above n 29, [582]. 
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services that can be offered during a strike that are sufficient to avoid 
endangering the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the 
population, while allowing for as comprehensive an exercise of the right as 
possible in the circumstances;125  
(v) a partial and restricted right to strike that compels an unnecessarily broad 
number of employees to continue to work and leaves only a relatively small 
number of employees with the ability to strike would make the exercise of 
the right futile, and the right to collectively bargain a hollow guarantee;  
(vi) in determining the appropriate level of services for a partial and 
restricted strike, provision is to be made for the meaningful involvement of 
the trade union(s) to establish the appropriate levels;  
(vii) … if it is genuinely determined that even a partial and restricted strike 
would nevertheless endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole 
or part of the population based on the minimal and proportional analysis, 
then the right to strike can be prohibited.126 
Furthermore, both the Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom 
of Association have recognised that, where essential service employees are 
restricted or indeed prohibited from exercising the right to strike, they should 
be afforded appropriate guarantees to compensate for these restrictions.127 
According to the Committee of Experts:  
If strikes are restricted or prohibited in the public services or in essential 
services, appropriate guarantees must be afforded to protect workers who are 
thus denied one of the essential means of defending their occupational 
interests. Restrictions should be offset by adequate impartial and speedy 
conciliation and arbitration procedures, in which the parties concerned can 
take part at every stage and in which the awards should in all cases be binding 
on both parties. Such awards, once rendered, should be rapidly and fully 
implemented.128  
125 In this regard, the Committee of Experts has said that such minimum service arrangements 
would be justified only where this does not ‘call into question the right to strike of the large 
majority of workers’: ILO, Freedom of Association, above n 58, [162]. See further, ILO, 
Freedom of Association — 2006 Digest, above n 29, [607] and the discussion below in relation 
to the establishment of a minimum service. 
126 This summary is drawn directly from Professor Lynk’s expert affidavit, above n 39, 16–17. 
127 See ILO, Freedom of Association — 2006 Digest, above n 29, [595]–[603]; ILO, Freedom of 
Association, above n 58, [164]. 
128 ILO, General Survey, above n 114, [214]. See also, ILO, Freedom of Association, above n 58, 
[164]; ILO, Freedom of Association — 2006 Digest, above n 29, [595]–[596]. Regarding the 
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An alternative approach to strikes in essential services is to require the 
maintenance of a minimum level of service during any strike, in which case 
trade unions should, along with the employers and public authorities, be able to 
participate in defining that minimum service.129 The Committee of Experts has 
proposed that, in order to avoid harms which are either irreversible or out of all 
proportion to the interests of the parties to a dispute, as well as damages to third 
parties, governments could avoid outright bans on strikes in essential public 
services by adopting this approach even to the public emergency services.130 In 
the Committee’s view, such a service should meet at least two key 
requirements. First, it must genuinely be a minimum service, that is, ‘one which 
is limited to the operations which are strictly necessary to meet the basic needs 
of the population or the minimum requirements of the service, while 
maintaining the effectiveness of the pressure brought to bear’. Second, workers’ 
organisations should be able, if they wish, to participate in determining such a 
service, along with employers and the public authorities.131  
Finally, it was noted earlier that the concept of essential services in the strict 
sense depends largely on a country’s particular circumstances. As a result, the 
Committee of Experts has stated that it is neither possible nor desirable to 
compile a ‘complete and fixed list’ of essential services.132 Nonetheless, the 
Committee on Freedom of Association’s Digest provides, in a general sense, an 
illustrative list of essential services. These are the services provided by the 
hospital sector; electricity services; water supply services; telephone services; 
services provided by the police and armed forces; fire-fighting services; prison 
services; the provision of food to school-age students, and the cleaning of 
schools; and air traffic control services.133 Once again, while these illustrations 
are not exhaustive, police and other public emergency services would be likely 
to be considered legitimate essential services under this approach.  
requirement of impartiality, see ILO, Freedom of Association — 2006 Digest, above n 29, [598]; 
Gernigon, Odero and Guido, ILO Principles Concerning the Right to Strike, above n 99, 453. 
129 ILO, General Survey, above n 114, [215]; Breen Creighton, ‘Enforcement in the Federal 
Industrial Relations System: an Australian Paradox’ (1991) 4(3) Australian Journal of Labour 
Law 197, 202.  
130 ILO, Public Emergency Services, above n 9, 103. See also, ILO ‘Joint Meeting on Conditions 
of Employment and Work of Fire-fighting Personnel’ (Report, International Labour 
Organisation, 9–16 May 1990) 8–9 (‘Joint Meeting’).   
131 ILO, Freedom of Association, above n 58, [161]. 
132 Ibid [159]; McCrystal, above n 98, 34. 
133 See further, ILO, Freedom of Association — 2006 Digest, above n 29, [585], [587]. 
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VI THE AUSTRALIAN CASE ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AND THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN ESSENTIAL SERVICES  
This part of the article compares Australian law with international labour 
standards with respect to essential public sector employees in the context of a 
strike in support of bargaining. Specifically, it analyses legislation governing 
essential service employees and police officers operating under Australia’s Fair 
Work Act 2009 (Cth); and assesses these provisions in the light of the prevailing 
jurisprudence of the ILO.  
Australia’s traditional system of regulating labour relations disputes through 
compulsory arbitration as an alternative to collective bargaining and the right 
to strike did not treat essential services as a special case. Essential service 
employees were subject to prohibitions on striking, but had access to the 
same binding arbitration processes as other employees.134
 
 This model would 
likely have met the ILO requirement that essential services workers denied the 
right to strike have access to rapid and impartial mechanisms for the resolution 
of bargaining disputes.135 However, major reforms in 1993 introduced a new 
principal object to the then Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth), making 
bargaining the dominant wage determination process, and introducing a right 
to strike. The shift to collective bargaining limited the scope for compulsory 
arbitration. At the same time, the changes were accompanied by special 
provisions for essential services, enabling the federal industrial tribunal to 
remove the right to industrial action and substitute compulsory arbitration in 
the event of ‘threatened danger’ to the public.136 
This position has continued virtually unchanged over the last two decades. The 
core objective of the current Fair Work Act is the achievement of productivity 
through enterprise-level collective bargaining premised on a limited right to 
strike.137 The Fair Work Act covers most Commonwealth (and Territory) public 
sector employees, including members of the Australian Federal Police (AFP), 
and most Victorian public sector employees, including members of the Victoria 
Police. However, the Act allows the national tribunal to remove the right to 
threatened or actual protected industrial action in key public interest situations, 
134 See generally Carol Fox, ‘Collective Bargaining and Essential Services: The Australian Case’ 
(1998) 40(2) Journal of Industrial Relations 277; and see also Carabetta, ‘Fair Work’ above n 
27, 263. 
135 Creighton, above n 129.  
136 Fox, above n 134, 279, 281.  
137 Fair Work Act, s 3(f); Geoff Giudice, ‘Keynote Address’ (Paper presented at the 21st Annual 
Labour Law Conference, The University of Sydney Workplace Research Centre, 22 July 2013) 
6–7.  
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including in the context of bargaining negotiations involving essential services. 
Section 424(1) of the Act provides:  
(1) The [Fair Work Commission] must make an order suspending or 
terminating protected industrial action for a proposed enterprise agreement 
that: 
(a) is being engaged in; or 
(b) is threatened, impending or probable; 
if the Fair Work Commission is satisfied that the protected industrial action 
has threatened, is threatening, or would threaten: 
(c) to endanger the life, the personal safety or health, or the welfare, of the 
population or of part of it; or 
(d) to cause significant damage to the Australian economy or an important 
part of it.138 
There can be little doubt that suspension or termination of protected industrial 
action under section 424 due to a threat to life or public safety is consistent with 
the restrictions allowed by the ILO with respect to essential services.139 
However, section 424 attaches additional criteria to be used in determining 
restrictions to the right to strike, namely damage to the economy or an important 
part of it. These additional criteria may not be synonymous with a threat to the 
life, or the personal safety (among other things) of the whole or part of 
the population, unless the harm also amounts to a threat to public safety.140 
Yet, as McCrystal points out, section 424 operates on the basis that economic 
138 The effect of the removal of protected industrial action on these grounds is that the 
Commission must determine the dispute through compulsory arbitration via a workplace 
determination: Fair Work Act, ss 266–267. 
139 Note however the suggestion that the term ‘welfare’ may also go beyond the ILO standard: 
Australian Nursing Federation (ANF), Submission No 1 to Senate Education, Employment and 
Workplace Relations References Committee, Inquiry into the Conditions of Employment of 
State Public Sector Employees and the Adequacy of Protection of Their Rights at Work as 
Compared with Other Employees, 15 January 2013, 15 <https://senate.aph.gov.au/ 
submissions/comittees/viewdocument.aspx?id=ffee9a98-980a-4523-9035-ad571d331a44>. 
While the following focuses on s 424 of the Act, it is also important to note that there are other 
provisions which do not comply with ILO standards, including s 424 (significant harm to a third 
party) and s 431 (significant damage to the Australian economy): see McCystal, above n 98, ch 
7. 
140 Creighton, above n 129, 15; McCrystal, above n 98, 253–4. 
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damage is, by itself, sufficient to restrict the right to strike, and this contravenes 
the standards of international law.141 
In defining essential services, section 424 follows a ‘consequences-based 
model’ [needs explanation] for essential public services, as do provisions in 
many other jurisdictions.142 Moreover, section 424 adopts a ‘hybrid’ approach 
for essential services, incorporating both a no-strike model and an unfettered 
strike model. It seeks to reconcile the ‘inherent tension’143 between, on the one 
hand, achieving a balance between employer and employee interests through 
the right to collective bargaining and the freedom to strike, and, on the other, 
the right to arbitration and the public interest in the maintenance of essential 
services. As noted, the ILO accepts that in practice an alternative approach to 
strikes in essential services may be to require the maintenance of a minimum 
level of service during a strike. Indeed, more recently, the Committee of Experts 
has expressed a preference for this option even in relation to police and other 
emergency services.144 The problem with section 424, however, is that it 
contains no pro-active measures for the protection of essential services during 
strikes. This is especially significant in the case of police officers and 
emergency services workers. While these workers are afforded an in principle 
right to protected industrial action in support of bargaining under the Act,145 
there is little scope for them to engage in such action. For police officers, 
industrial actions that would generally qualify for protection would be limited 
to such activities as working-to-rule, bans on the giving of notices for speeding 
or traffic infringements, and the like.146 These actions place financial pressure 
on the employer without placing the community’s safety or welfare at risk. 
Beyond this, however, it may be asked how access to protected action under 
141 McCrystal, above n 98. Observations of both ILO supervisory bodies in relation to Australia 
clearly confirm that economic damage of itself is not compatible with the standards of the ILO 
to limit the right to strike: at 254–5. 
142 See Bernard Adell, Michel Grant and Allen Ponak, Strikes in Essential Services (IRC Press, 
2001). Under a consequences (or harm-based) approach, rather than legislation specifically 
naming certain services as essential, special laws may be invoked if industrial action is deemed 
by a tribunal to threaten particular consequences: ibid, drawing on Gillian Morris, Strikes in 
Essential Services (Mansell, 1986) 8.  
143 Lynk, above n 39, 54, referring to the academic literature on essential services. 
144 See ILO, Public Emergency Services, above n 9, 103. See also, ILO, Joint Meeting, above n 
130.   
145 In addition to a number of general limitations on the right to ‘protected action’ of all 
employees under the Fair Work Act (see below), there are doubts surrounding the scope of the 
‘protected action’ provisions of the Act for police officers: see Carabetta, Fair Work, above n 
27, 268–9. 
146 Such limited forms of industrial actions by police officers have generally been allowable in 
Australia, despite formal restrictions on industrial action: see Carabetta, Fair Work, above n 27, 
263, n 68. 
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the Act can provide employees such as police officers with a right to engage 
in free bargaining, when by definition almost any industrial action by them 
would threaten public safety or welfare and so lead to a termination or 
suspension of the protected action.147 
The Fair Work Act approach may be contrasted with the hybrid models of other 
jurisdictions, including various Canadian models,148 which allow the right to 
strike but require, before the current agreement expires, the designation of 
positions considered essential. Employees in such positions are prohibited from 
striking. Designation may occur via an ‘essential services agreement’ or 
arbitration. Moreover, once the agreement is finalised, most models allow for 
the union or either party to dispute the classification and number of essential 
services.149 The lack of such features (or similar arrangements) in the Fair 
Work Act means that the right to bargain and to strike may be compromised, 
and the question may be asked whether the Act should contain provisions 
requiring the parties in good faith to negotiate minimum service 
agreements.150 Aside from the added certainty that this would bring to 
bargaining, a further advantage, consistent with ILO standards, is that it 
would encourage consultation with trade unions regarding essential service 
designations, thereby promoting added social dialogue between the parties. 
It is also important to note that the Fair Work Act contains a number of general 
restrictions on protected industrial action applicable to all employees. These are 
examined in detail by McCrystal in The Right to Strike in Australia,151 her 
analysis pointing to significant restrictions on access to protected action under 
the Act. These restrictions include limitations on the range of claims that may 
be pursued through strike action. They also include prohibitions on taking 
147 Cf Justice Roger Boland, ‘Some Current Matters of Interest’ (Paper presented at the Annual 
Conference of the Industrial Relations Society of NSW, Kiama, 18 May 2012) [26]. In 
presenting findings on the impact of the precursor provision to s 424 of the Fair Work Act?, 
Fox concludes that while the Commission had varied in its willingness to allow or to 
suspend/terminate bargaining, a key factor in determining the level of impact of the industrial 
action was the nature of the work involved: Fox, above n 134, 302.  
148 See Fox, above n 134, 279 for a useful summary of the various models used in Canada.  
149 See further, Lynk, above n 39, 26–48; and see generally, Bernard Adell, Michel Grant and 
Allen Ponak, above n 142. Lynk explains that the idea of a Designation Model is to ‘treat the 
provision of essential services as an enclave to be sheltered from the interplay of economic 
power [between the union and the employer]’, and for this reason ‘a third party … is made 
responsible for deciding on the nature and extent of essential services should the union 
and employer be unable to agree’: above n 39, quoting from Adell, Grant and Ponak, above n 
142, 10. 
150 Where such measures are adopted under the current model, this is solely the product of private 
or self-regulation: Fox, above n 134, 302. 
151 McCrystal, above n 98. 
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protected action on a broader range of social and economic interests. 
McCrystal argues that, when combined with the limitations under section 424, 
these restrictions make access to industrial action under the Act ‘a privilege 
rather than a right [which] goes against the international labour law 
requirement to respect the right to strike’.152 It is important to appreciate that 
they apply to essential service employees and police officers in the same way 
as to other employees.  
If essential service employees and police officers face such restrictions on their 
capacity to engage in industrial action, the question then is whether they are, 
as required by the ILO, afforded ‘adequate, impartial and speedy conciliation 
and arbitration’. Again, this is all the more significant in the case of police 
officers, given the additional restrictions on their capacity to engage in 
legitimate strike action.153 The Fair Work Act offers some scope for 
compulsory arbitration in specified circumstances; including where the Fair 
Work Commission terminates protected industrial action under section 424. 
In general, however, the Act provides very limited scope for the compulsory 
arbitration of collective bargaining disputes.154 Limitations on the capacity of 
the Fair Work tribunal to resolve disputes involving police officers arise also 
by virtue of the exclusion of a range of matters from bargaining.155 These 
exclusions go beyond those applicable to other public employees under the 
Act156 and, combined with constraints on the right to strike, particularly 
disadvantage police officers in affected jurisdictions. Further, where no 
adequate alternative provisions have been put in place under the relevant 
Police Act, the exclusions have produced ‘gaps’ in the regulatory 
framework.157  
Victoria is the only state, to date, to have referred its public sector employment 
powers to the Commonwealth, such that the Fair Work Act regulates the 
employment of all Victorian public sector employees.158 As a result, the 
152 McCrystal, above n 98, 195–6. 
153 See text accompanying n 145–151.  
154 Mark Bray and Andrew Stewart, ‘From the Arbitration System to the Fair Work Act: The 
Changing Approach in Australia to Voice and Representation at Work’ (2103) 34(1) Adelaide 
Law Review 21 <http://www.adelaide.edu.au/press/journals/law-review/issues/alr_34_1.pdf>. 
155 The exclusions relate to appointment, transfer, conduct and various other operational matters. 
See Carabetta, Fair Work, above n 27, 271–5.  
156 These exclusions, concerning (Victorian) State public sector employees operating under the 
Fair Work Act, apply by virtue of s 5 of the Fair Work (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2009 (Vic) 
and relate to appointment and redundancy matters, and matters pertaining to high-level officers. 
157 Carabetta, Fair Work, above n 27.  
158 For details, see Carabetta, Fair Work, above n 27. 
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capacity of Victorian essential service employees and police officers to engage 
in industrial action is subject to the same restrictions. In addition, however, 
amongst the matters excluded from the Fair Work Act under Victoria’s referral 
of public sector employment powers are directions given to public sector 
employees under that State’s essential services or state of emergency 
legislation.159 So while essential service employees and police officers in 
Victoria have access (to the extent that they apply) to the protected action 
provisions of the Fair Work Act, those provisions may not prevent the employer 
from otherwise seeking to rely on these state laws where these employees are 
deemed to have engaged in unprotected action.160  
Thus the Essential Services Act 1958 (Vic) enables the Governor-in-Council to 
declare that a state of emergency exists in relation to an ‘essential service’. Such 
a declaration may be made where it appears that any action has been or is likely 
to be taken whereby an essential service is or is likely to be interrupted, 
dislocated or materially diminished and: 
(a) the opportunity of persons (other than those by whom the action has been 
taken or is likely to be taken or has been threatened to be taken) to be gainfully 
employed in their usual occupations; or 
(b) the health or safety of the public or any section of the public; or 
(c) the maintenance of peace and good order in Victoria  
is prejudiced or threatened or is likely to be prejudiced or threatened.161 
It will be seen that, like section 424 of the Fair Work Act, the Essential Services 
Act uses a consequences-based approach to the definition of essential services. 
However, essential services are defined to include services such as the 
provision of transport, fuel, light, power or sewerage.162 Interestingly, the 
definition does not expressly refer to police or other emergency services, but 
159 See Fair Work (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2009 (Vic), s 5(1)(h)–(k); Fair Work 
(Commonwealth Powers) Bill 2009, Explanatory Memorandum, 5. This provision clearly 
comprehends essential public sector employees, including police officers: Fair Work 
(Commonwealth Powers) Act 2009 (Vic) s 3(2). 
160 Further, to the extent that the Essential Services Act 1958 (Vic) relies on specific criminal — 
as distinct from civil — remedies, any proceedings brought against employees or their trade 
unions under these provisions would not come within the scope of the immunity offered by s 
415 of the Fair Work Act. 
161 Essential Services Act 1958 (Vic) s 4(1).  
162 Essential Services Act 1958 (Vic) s 3. Certain other state jurisdictions also have essential 
services provisions. See in particular the Essential Services Act 1988 (NSW) and the Essential 
Services Act 1981 (SA). See also the Vital State Industries (Works and Services) Act 1992 (Vic).  
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does include ‘any other service specified from time to time by the Governor in 
Council’.163 An order declaring services to be essential services would need to 
be made to enable the Minister to exercise a wide range of powers granted under 
section 5 of the Act. If a state of emergency were declared, the Minister may 
provide, operate, control, regulate and direct that service; including the terms 
and conditions upon which the service shall operate.164 
The Committee of Experts has expressed a number of concerns about the 
Essential Services Act (and the essential services Acts of other state 
jurisdictions). In particular, the Essential Services Act definition of ‘essential 
service’ in section 3 (like the definition used in other states) appears to go 
beyond the strict meaning of that term as adopted by the ILO.165 Rather than 
confining the definition of essential service to those services whose interruption 
would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the population, the 
Essential Services Act definition encompasses the harm posed by industrial 
action to the opportunity of persons to be meaningfully employed, and the 
maintenance of peace and good order of Victoria.166 The Committee of Experts’ 
concern extends also to the power vested in the Governor-in-Council by section 
3(g) to declare any service essential, since the exercise of that power is based 
on the same expansive definition.167  
The other major problem with the Essential Services Act is that the legislative 
focus is on the exercise of coercive powers by the courts or government to 
maintain services and to punish those withdrawing them.168 The legislation is 
not specific to labour relations, and, contrary to ILO principles of freedom of 
association, there is no adequate substitute protection for the loss of the right to 
strike in the form of compulsory conciliation or arbitration (or like) procedures. 
This may be contrasted with the position under the Essential Services Act 1988 
(NSW), which (although similarly problematic in other respects)169 provides 
163 Essential Services Act 1958 (Vic) s 3(g). Other state jurisdictions in Australia also omit to 
refer expressly to police officers, but do include other emergency services such as fire-fighting 
and ambulance services. See, for example, Essential Services Act 1988 (NSW) s 4. 
164 Essential Services Act 1958 (Vic) s 5. 
165 The Committee of Experts itself has often queried the scope of the NSW essential services 
provisions, and expressed concern about the scope and effect of essential services provisions of 
other states, including Victoria’s Essential Services Act. See Breen Creighton, ‘The ILO and 
the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights in Australia’ (1998) 22(2) Melbourne University 
Law Review 239. 
166 Essential Services Act 1958 (Vic) s 4(1)(a), (c).  
167 Cf Creighton, Ford and Mitchell, above n 106, [33.20], referring to an observation of the 
Committee of Experts regarding the Essential Services Act 1988 (NSW).  
168 Cf Fox, above n 134, 280, referring to Australian state essential services provisions generally.   
169 See Creighton, above n 129. 
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for the reference of disputes in essential services to the NSW industrial 
tribunal.170  
Finally, as with the state essential services provisions, the Committee of 
Experts has repeatedly expressed concerns over sections 30J and 30K of the 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).171 While these provisions are rarely invoked, they can 
nevertheless be used as a basis for criminal proceedings against individuals who 
participate in, or otherwise organise, a wide range of industrial action in the 
Commonwealth public services, and the transport industry.172 It is of concern 
that the powers in sections 30J and 30K do not accord with the criteria set out 
by the ILO supervisory bodies with respect to essential services.173 Further, to 
the extent that sections 30J and 30K apply to essential public sector workers 
and the Australian Federal Police,174 there is again no adequate compensatory 
mechanism for the loss of the right to strike. 
VII CONCLUSIONS 
The focus of this paper has been labour standards which were adopted under 
the auspices of the ILO and which constitute the principal international 
influences on public sector collective bargaining. The ILO, through the work 
of its supervisory bodies, recognises that the right to voluntary free collective 
bargaining and the right to strike constitute essential elements of the freedom 
of association. The supervisory committees assert that these fundamental rights 
are to be construed broadly and purposively, and that exceptions must be 
applied narrowly.  
In the public sector, the right to free collective bargaining and the freedom to 
withdraw services are to be given full effect, save in exceptional cases. Under 
170 Essential Services Act 1988 (NSW) s 115; Creighton, above n 129. 
171 See, for example, ILO, Observation (CEACR) concerning the Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) — Australia (Ratification: 
1973), (International Labour Conference — 85th Session, 1997) <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/norm 
lex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_ID,P11
110_COUNTRY_NAME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:2149711,102544,Australia,1996>. 
172 Creighton, Ford and Mitchell, above n 106, [33.14]. 
173 See, for example, ILO, Direct Request (CEACR) concerning the Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) — Australia (Ratification: 
1973), (International Labour Conference — 80th Session, 1993) <http://www.ilo.org/dyn 
/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_I
D,P11110_COUNTRY_NAME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:2117471,102544,Australia,199
3>. 
174 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 30J(2)(b), 30K(b)–(c). 
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ILO standards, restrictions on, or the removal of, the general right of workers 
to collective bargaining, and the substitution of compulsory arbitration for that 
collective bargaining, can be imposed on certain groups of public sector 
workers, including police officers and members of the armed forces. However, 
these restrictions and substitutions are at the discretion of individual countries. 
Restrictions on, or the removal of, the general right to collective bargaining can 
likewise be justified in the case of truly essential public services,175 but must 
be compensated for by impartial and speedy conciliation and arbitration 
processes. Based on the particular characteristics of public services, ‘special 
modalities’ of application for collective bargaining are allowable in these 
public services. However, according to the ILO, exceptions must again be 
applied proportionately and narrowly, leaving ‘significant room’ for 
bargaining. They should also be preceded by social dialogue with the 
representative organisations of public servants.  
The ILO’s supervisory bodies have held that although third party mechanisms 
such as conciliation and arbitration can facilitate bargaining, any third party 
involvement must respect the autonomy of the parties. Whatever type of 
machinery is applied, its primary objective should be the encouragement of 
voluntary arrangements. The ILO has emphasised that where dispute resolution 
procedures are established not by the parties themselves but by law, those 
procedures must be sufficiently independent and impartial to ensure the 
confidence of the parties in practice. Further, the Committee of Experts has 
underscored the importance of voluntary conciliation, mediation and arbitration 
being designed appropriately to settle bargaining disputes fairly and speedily. 
The supervisory bodies have repeatedly emphasised that the use of compulsory 
arbitration is not easily reconcilable with the principles of voluntary collective 
bargaining. However, recourse to compulsory arbitration as an exception to 
collective bargaining is allowable in specified circumstances, particularly 
where it is the product of consent between the parties. One of those 
circumstances is in the case of essential public services in the strict sense. A 
clear example is seen in approaches to collective bargaining in the public 
emergency services, including police services. Compulsory arbitration is often 
used in these essential areas of public service as a trade off to the right to strike, 
although even in this context the blanket prohibition of strikes is nowadays less 
frequent than in the past.  
According to ILO standards, the freedom of public sector workers to strike can 
be limited in the case of essential public service employees, including police 
175 As noted, in ILO terms essential services are those ‘the interruption of which would endanger 
the life, personal safety or health of the whole of part of the population.’ 
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officers, on a minimal and proportional basis; but this must be offset by 
adequate, impartial and speedy conciliation and arbitration mechanisms. 
However, again, a government is not compelled to prohibit the right to strike 
for these workers. Even in the case of police officers, the ILO has said that it is 
‘worth considering the possibility of avoiding a total ban on strikes in [these 
areas] by ensuring the maintenance of a minimum service’,176 where trade 
unions participate in determining that minimum service along with employers 
and the public authorities. In the ILO’s view, such arrangements not only align 
with workers’ rights to social dialogue, but can also enhance management-
employee relations in these employment areas.  
In Australia over the last two decades, essential public service employees and 
police officers coming within the federal jurisdiction have for the first time been 
afforded a limited right to industrial action as part of collective bargaining. The 
federal tribunal has been given special powers under the Fair Work Act to 
remove the right to strike and substitute compulsory arbitration where the 
community’s health or safety is threatened. On one level, this provision is 
consistent with ILO restrictions in respect of essential services, and with the 
need to recognise a right to strike and the public interest in the maintenance of 
essential services. However, contrary to suggestions from the ILO and 
international solutions,177 as well as affording limited immunity from industrial 
action, the Act contains no formal measures for the maintenance of essential 
services. For police and other emergency services in particular, there is minimal 
scope for protected action and uncertainty surrounding the right to bargain. 
At the same time however, there is limited scope for compulsory arbitration — 
a point that has been highlighted by a number of high-profile long running 
disputes.178  
The Essential Services Act applies to essential services employees and police 
officers in Victoria whose employment conditions are regulated by the Fair 
Work Act. The Act is particularly problematic from an ILO-compliance 
perspective. Not only does it allow for an overly broad definition of essential 
services, but, as with similar provisions in other states, its focus is the exercise 
of coercive legal powers to maintain essential services. The Act provides no 
adequate compensatory measures for the loss of the right to strike, in the form 
of compulsory conciliation and arbitration procedures. Similar observations 
apply, as the ILO Committee of Experts itself has confirmed, in relation to 
176 ILO, Public Emergency Services, above n 9, 103. See further, the comments of the Committee 
of Experts in ILO, ‘Joint Meeting’, above n 130.  
177 Such as the approach applied to essential services in a number of Canadian jurisdictions, for 
example. 
178 See Boland, above n 147. 
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sections 30J and 30K of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), which clearly cover 
situations where industrial action is causing major social or commercial harm, 
or both. 
The ILO has in more recent times paid increased attention to collective 
bargaining in the public services. In the various ILO review reports referred to 
in this paper,179 the ILO and its supervisory committees note a global expansion 
in bargaining in public services, and further ‘democratisation’ of labour 
relations even in emergency and police services. Yet ironically, while 
Australia’s shift to a bargaining model premised on the right to strike has better 
aligned it with ILO standards vis-à-vis the private sector,180 the opposite is true 
for its essential public sector workers. It is also clear that international models 
are the result of greater debate concerning essential public employees than has 
occurred in Australia.181 This factor, together with the problems relating to ILO 
compliance in Australia, suggests that there is value in Australian policy-
makers and legislators examining international solutions for the regulation of 
essential public sector employees. 
179 ILO, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: A Way Forward, above n 3; ILO, Manual 
on Collective Bargaining, above n 23; ILO, Public Emergency Services, above n 9. 
180 Australia’s previous system of compulsory arbitration had raised questions regarding 
compliance with the ILO’s principles of freedom of association: Owens, Riley and Murray, 
above n 15, [2.3.2]. 
181 Fox, above n 134, referring in particular to Canadian solutions. 
                                                 
